1998 Hugo L. Black Lecture: Ten Arguments against Affirmative Action--How Valid Lecture by Delgado, Richard
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1998 
1998 Hugo L. Black Lecture: Ten Arguments against Affirmative 
Action--How Valid Lecture 
Richard Delgado 
University of Alabama - School of Law, rdelgado@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Delgado, 1998 Hugo L. Black Lecture: Ten Arguments against Affirmative Action--How Valid 
Lecture, 50 Ala. L. Rev. 135 (1998). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/437 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. 
1998 HUGO L. BLACK LECTURE: TEN ARGUMENTS
AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION-How VALID?
Richard Delgado*
Thanks to the Alabama faculty and especially Dean Ken
Randall for the invitation to speak here today. I am honored to
give an address named after one of the greatest and most coura-
geous Supreme Court justices. Hugo Black began his political
life as an enthusiastic member of the Ku Klux Klan, but ended
it as a supporter of African-American equality.' When he joined
the majority in Brown v. Board of Education,2 his friends in this
state shunned him, and he was not invited to his class's fiftieth
reunion.' For a "Clay County hillbilly,"4 as he called himself, to
come that far is certainly remarkable. He was not without his
faults, later ruling against civil rights sit-ins5 and in favor of
Japanese internment.6 A complex figure, it is interesting to
speculate how he would have come out on issues of affirmative
action and diversity raging today.
Not long ago, I stood in front of another university audience
like this one, speaking on a similar, although not identical, sub-
ject--diversity. A certain irony attended the occasion, the gradu-
ation of the 1996 class at Boalt Hall, the law school where I
myself graduated more than twenty years ago. As it turns out,
my class at Boalt was the first to experience a fully diversified
student body throughout all three years; the one I addressed is
likely to be the last.
Let me paint the scene for you. Here was the Greek The-
* Professor of Law, Jean Lindsley Chair, University of Colorado at Boulder;
J.D., 1974 University of California at Berkeley.
1 See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 441.
4 Id. at 3.
5 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 152 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Hamm v.
City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 319 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
6 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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ater, a giant outdoor bowl surrounded by eucalyptus trees and
overflowing with the most diverse imaginable crowd of proud
parents, brothers, sisters, and other relatives of the graduates
sitting on stage, waiting for the speeches to end and the magic
moment to arrive when they would collect that coveted diploma.
Large Chicano families with young children mingled with equal-
ly large African American ones from all over the nation. And, of
course, Asian and white families were liberally sprinkled among
them. Earlier a steel marimba band had played salsa music un-
der the sun, cutting to Pomp and Circumstance when it was
time for the procession. I was struck by how perfectly inaptly
certain critics and even defenders of diversity and affirmative
action frame the debate about them. Diversity is not a
heavy-handed obligation, risky social experiment, or vengeful
righting of the scales, but a giant celebration. Like a party, a
graduation, a meal at a good ethnic restaurant, or international
travel, diversity should be a source of pleasure, wonderment,
delight. Not at all a win-lose proposition, diversity can be a win
for everyone, white, black, brown, Native American, or anything
else, opening the door to new ideas, skills, and experiences.
But or, course, not everyone sees it that way. Others see
diversity in the same way some motorists cruising a large,
crowded parking lot see the handful of parking spaces reserved
for the disabled, certain that if it had not been for those re-
served slots, they would be safely parked by now.
On day one, most law school deans greet the entering class
with an inspiring speech in the course of which they tell them a
little bit about each other. My entering class, if I recall, included
a professional ballet dancer, several owners of small businesses,
and a clown from the Barnum and Bailey Circus. It also con-
tained a number of social workers, community activists, and
organizers looking for new skills in the struggle against poverty
and inequality.
That was how we entered. My class was about thirty per-
cent minority, like the one I was to address. Curious where all
that diversity went, I asked administrators at Boalt to do a bit of
research and tell me where my fellow students of color, and
women, too-for then law schools were also making special ef-
forts to raise the numbers of women enrolled-all products of
affirmative action, wound up. Did they all flunk out, fail the bar
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exam, or assimilate silently into obscure, gray corners of the
corporate kingdom?
Here is a small sample of what I learned. They all passed
the bar exam, after which a certain Paul, who sat opposite me in
class, became CEO of Broadway Federal Bank, the largest Afri-
can American-owned financial institution in the United States. I
wish I had gotten to know him better. Six classmates of color
became California State Court judges, including Lance Ito, who
even then seemed bound for distinction! Richard was recently
nominated to the Ninth Circuit. Jose, the chief justice of the
Supreme Court of the Northern Mariana Islands. Jennifer be-
came a hearing judge for the Merit Systems Protection Board of
California. Ted, executive corporate counsel for Wells Fargo--
another person I wish I had gotten to know better. Ginger, dep-
uty administrator of the U.S. Small Business Administration.
Charles, a partner at Davis Wright Tremaine. Frank, U.S.
Congressperson, Texas. Thomas, solicitor for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor and deputy inspector general of the Energy De-
partment. Ned, partner at Paul Hastings, in San Francisco.
Richard, partner, Rivkin Radler. Susan, Kate, and Laura, profes-
sors of law at Washington University of St. Louis, Duke Univer-
sity, and Georgetown, respectively. Jessica, pioneering female
managing partner of a major law firm (Heller Ehrman). Lois,
executive director of Children Now. Claudia, U.S. District Court
judge. Not to mention three more law firm partners, a New York
State Supreme Court justice, a Goldman Fund executive, a di-
rector of Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights, another professor
of law, a state bar presiding judge, and one state bar president.
And, of course, Yours Truly, professional typist. As you know,
the Cassandras and detractors of affirmative action warn that
we are in danger of sacrificing quality. Well, you certainly could
not tell it from that list. I have never felt so much like an under-
achiever.
At the law school where I now teach, in each of the last
several years the minority students, many of whom were admit-
ted under diversity programs with lower LSATs than the others,
graduated at the same rate, found jobs more quickly, and earned
a slightly higher entering salary than their classmates as a
group. Not only that, they obtained prestigious positions, such as
judicial clerk or university professorships, at a slightly higher
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rate. Certainly, all our students are smart, capable, and go on to
fine careers, but the diversity part of the party does as well as
the rest. Moreover, my travels around the country convince me
that what is true at our school is also true elsewhere: attend the
tenth- or twentieth-year reunion of the black or minority stu-
dents association, and you find yourself in a roomful of extreme-
ly distinguished people--commissioners, judges, partners, attor-
neys general, and so on. Do not mistake what I am saying: law
schools, like other social institutions, should be trying constantly
to improve the quality of all of the people they admit, train, and
turn loose on the world. But higher education is one of the few
things that America emphatically does right-our universities
are the envy of the world, every year unfailingly attracting the
best foreign students-and diversity is one of those programs we
do right, as well.
I sometimes think that defending diversity is like having to
justify a really good party or celebration. Why would anyone
need to? Yet, as I mentioned, some people focus on the three
reserved slots in the parking lot rather than the tiny displace-
ment rate and great social utility of setting aside these spaces.
The next part of my talk is aimed at them and the principal
arguments they tend to assert.
I will not be discussing here reasons that argue in favor of
affirmative action, just ones against it. I favor it, obviously, be-
lieving its benefits practically self-evident, but others and I have
spelled out the case for it elsewhere, so that interested members
of the audience can simply look it up, for example in my book
The Rodrigo Chronicles.7 If you are conservative, these are my
answers to your arguments; if liberal, tools you can use to de-
fend your position.
With those provisos, the first argument is the one from
stigma. A paternalistic argument, it holds that we should reject
affirmative action, even though most people of color support it,
because it would only injure them. If they knew their own self-
interest, they would oppose it. This argument tends to be made
by liberals who genuinely like minorities but worry about their
black friend with the IQ of 149, who may be unfairly labeled an
7 RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMER-
ICA AND RACE (1995).
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affirmative-action baby. It is also made by some principled con-
servatives who actually fear affirmative action will do more
harm than good and do not want that harm to befall blacks. And
it is also made disingenuously by people who do not much like
blacks or Mexicans at all, much less care if they are stigmatized,
but think it is a good argument against something they dislike
and want to see ended.
The stigma argument holds, in brief, that affirmative action
will hurt all blacks, Mexicans, Asians, and so forth, even those
who got to the top by their own merits. In the absence of other
information, observers will assume that they did so with the aid
of the unseen hand. The argument is empirical. It holds that if
you do X, something bad will happen. But stigmatization and
negative stereotyping of people of color in the media and movies,
and as reflected in public opinion polls, has either held constant
or decreased in the roughly thirty-year period that affirmative
action has been in place. Before this time, stereotyping of blacks
and other minorities was rampant-groveling maids. and Aunt
Jemimas, shoot-you-in-the-back Mexicans, "ugh-want-urn"
Indians, and more. Many states had laws on the books forbid-
ding interracial marriage until 1967, when Loving v. Virginia8
declared them unconstitutional.9 What more stigmatic message
could exist than that-a law that says that if you are black or
Asian, you are unfit to marry a white?
Stigma is in plentiful supply still, but it predates and oper-
ates independently of affirmative action. Almost all universities
admit athletes, musicians for the school orchestra, holders of
ROTC scholarships, and legacy candidates (sons or daughters of
wealthy alums) with SATs and grades considerably lower than
those of the students regularly admitted. Does the star quarter-
back feel stigmatized?
Most schools employ a geographical preference, favoring stu-
dents from far away, even though they all study from the same
textbooks and watch the same television programs. When Stan-
ford admits a student from rural New Hampshire with numbers
a little lower than those of the genius from Marin County, Cali-
fornia, does the New Hampshire student feel stigmatized or re-
8 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
9 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
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gard himself or herself as a case of affirmative action? Do veter-
ans, who receive special consideration in federal job programs,
feel stigmatized because of the way they got their jobs? Does a
disabled person feel stigmatized when he or she goes up a ramp
to a restaurant or public building that was installed pursuant to
federal law? No, it is only people of color who are said to be. An
odd selectivity, in my opinion.
The second argument is that affirmative action helps those
blacks and other minorities who need it least: the proverbial son
or daughter of the black neurosurgeon who got into Stanford or
Harvard under an affirmative action program. This, too, is an
empirical claim, and unlike the first one has a small grain of
truth to it. The students of color who get into Stanford, Berkeley
or Alabama are apt not to be the ones whose parents were dope
fiends and dropped out of inner-city schools at age eight, but a
little higher up the socioeconomic ladder. But the social status of
whites at top schools is even higher. A straight-line correlation
links standardized test scores and family income; zip codes pre-
dict LSAT scores better than those scores predict law school
grades. At one law school at which I once taught, the average
family income, in today's terms, was over $100,000. Are we not
also helping those whites who need it least?
The black middle class, a few of whose sons and daughters
do get into colleges through affirmative action, is indeed grow-
ing; but as writer Andrew Hacker points out, it stands on quite
a different footing from that of the white middle class.1" A black
family with a yearly income of $75,000 is apt to consist of a bus
driver making $45,000 and a nurse earning $30,000, while the
white family is apt to consist of a male engineer making that
amount and a mother who stays home or works part-time.1
Just as black poverty is different from the white kind-it tends
to last forever-black membership in the middle class is more
insecure than that of whites. Blacks fall from the middle class
more often and suddenly. Their children are more likely to be
downwardly mobile. Even those who reach comfortable profes-
sional status, making $250,000 a year or more, according to Ellis
10 ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 93-106 (1992).
11 Id. at 94-99.
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Cose, endure racial insults and lockouts on account of their
color.12 I personally have had conservatives virtually
cross-examine me, certain that I must be the son of Eva Peron,
a Venezuelan oil magnate, or a brown neurosurgeon. When they
learn I am instead the son of a Mexican orphan who immigrated
illegally to the United States at the age of fifteen without a cent
to his name and a woman from the tenement district of Chicago,
they act puzzled and disappointed. They know there has to be a
brown neurosurgeon in there somewhere.
Consider how we also apply this argument unevenly. The
unstated assumption is that we should put all our resources
where they are most needed, namely into dirt-poor blacks and
Mexicans. But we do not apply the same standard to professors
who ask for no morning classes or want all their classes in a
three-day block. We do not tell them, "Shame on you. You have
no business worrying about that when the real problem is can-
cer, AIDS, children in Appalachia, or secretaries who are going
blind from staring at computer display terminals all day long."
We simply accommodate them because they are our friends, and
we want to please them. But with middle class blacks it seems
unnatural to us that they should have advanced so far and
shameful that they would want even more.
The fact is that race is probably the best measure of social
disadvantage that we have, even better than poverty. If you
compare the prospects of a group of middle-income blacks from
families earning, say, $50,000 to those of relatively poor whites
making $20,000, you will find that the white kids, on the aver-
age, have better life prospects than the blacks. In many parts of
the country, a black with a college degree earns as much as a
white high school drop-out.
A third argument is that affirmative action operates like an
unfortunate stairstep, admitting to top schools students of color
who otherwise would go to middle-tier ones, and so on down the
line. The result, according to writers such as Lino Graglia and
Abigail Thernstrom, is that minority students always end up
over their heads." One who would have done well at Fordham
12 ELLIs COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993).
13 Lino Graglia, "Affirmative Action," Past, Present, and Future, 22 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 1207, 1216 (1996); Abigail Thernstrom, The Real Problem, 19 HARVARD J.L.
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instead gets into Harvard, where he or she is supposedly misera-
ble, scores in the bottom of his or her class, considers suicide,
and possibly drops out, when the same individual would have
been happier and better adjusted had he or she studied in the
less heady atmosphere of a second-tier school. Like the two
previous arguments, this one is paternalistic, pretending concern
for minorities and using that as a basis for phasing out a pro-
gram that helps them. It, too, relies on an empirical premise:
namely, that affirmative action harms its beneficiaries. This
premise is difficult to maintain in the face of the generally high
morale, camaraderie, and success record of minorities at my
university and elsewhere. A recent book by two university presi-
dents shows that at elite colleges, where affirmative action is
deployed aggressively, blacks, at least, earn degrees at a rate
within a few percentage points of whites and go on to careers of
great success. 4
It also presupposes that exposure to first-rate education is
not good for you but bad. Going to a school with a favorable
student-faculty ratio and studying under nationally acclaimed
professors is good for whites, but not for blacks. This is truly
paradoxical, and I am surprised bright people assert it. Rich
people of all eras have been sending their sons and daughters
not to the worst, but the best schools they could get them into,
sometimes bending the rules to do so. There is little reason to
believe that what is true for whites is not true for blacks, Mexi-
cans, and other minorities.
The staircase argument also presupposes the argument from
merit, namely that blacks and others of color on the average
have less going for them and that facilitating their entry into
law schools, jobs, and other charmed circles violates that sacred
principle. This is argument number four. How would you like to
be operated on by a surgeon who got into medical school not
because of his or her scientific ability but skin color, the argu-
ment goes. In many ways this is a central criticism of affirma-
tive action, but it, too, begs the question. Now, I am not one to
& PUB. POLY 767, 770 (1996).
14 See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK CURTIS BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS (1998).
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maintain that every person of color is hardworking, trusty,
thrifty, smart, and loyal. There is a range, just as with white
people. But the merit argument holds that affirmative action
generally, or always, places underqualified workers and students
into jobs or slots over more highly qualified ones, presumably
white or Asian. Once again, I am not saying that there is no
such thing as an incompetent black or Mexican, any more than
anyone could sensibly maintain that no whites squander inheri-
tances, make poor use of their opportunities, or are just plain
underpowered. But I defy anyone to produce evidence that the
average level of services has gone down in the United States
over the thirty years or so of affirmative action. The United
States economy has taken nose dives from time to time, but
these have been more the product of short-sighted behavior in
executive suites, here and abroad, than on the part of
hardworking immigrants and minorities working in restaurants,
cutting grass, burning the midnight oil in the library, and doing
a thousand other things, usually efficiently and for low wages.
It ends up, then, that the meritocrat is stuck with SAT
scores and the like, where minorities do indeed, on the average,
score lower. Does that mean they lack merit? Of course not,
unless by merit you mean scoring high on a three-hour, multiple
choice test taken on a Saturday in October. The SAT, until re-
cently, included items about polo mallets, lacrosse, and regattas.
How likely is a poor kid from the inner city to spend his or her
weekend playing lacrosse or attending regattas? The SAT's origi-
nator, Carl Campbell Brigham, was an unabashed white su-
premacist who wrote a book in 1923 entitled A Study of Ameri-
can Intelligence,5 in which he warned that Southern European
immigrants and minorities were swamping the country with
their inferior genes, at the expense of those of superior Europe-
an stock. 6 He also warned against interbreeding and urged
that we close our borders." Two years later, he became director
of the College Board's testing program, in which capacity he
based the first test on Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great
Race,8 a white supremacist tract. The tests purpose was to
15 CARL C. BRIGHAM, A STUDY OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE (1923).
16 Id. at 197.
17 Id. at 205-10.
18 MADISON GRANT & HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT
1998] 143
Alabama Law Review
confirm the superiority of white test takers, pure and simple.
You might think today's testing organizations would have repu-
diated his teaching, but the Educational Testing Service library
today bears his name.
Furthermore, the SAT is eminently coachable. The director
of one of the prominent test-coaching companies, which charges
nearly $1000 for its services, boasted that his organization was
able to boost the score of the average test taker by 185 points.
Thirty percent improved by 250 or more. Because of the high
price charged, the children of the wealthy naturally are more
likely to be able to take the course.
A further problem for merit advocates in educational set-
tings like this one is what I call the paradox of distributed mer-
it. The paradox lies in the moral irrationality of using merit
criteria to distribute regimens or programs that can give the
recipient a boost in an attribute that forms a part of, or is a pre-
existing element of, the very same set of merit criteria used for
distributive purposes. It would be like a paint store that only
sold yellow paint for houses that were already yellow. If law
school can boost anyone's LSAT--and we say that the purpose of
law classes is to get you to think like a lawyer--it becomes irra-
tional to insist on an absurdly high test score as a condition of
entrance.
Consider, also, how contingent ideas of merit are. LSAT
scores do predict law school first-year grades. But they also
reflect the backgrounds and training and advantages of those
who thrive under them, as well as correspond to the law firm
jobs and prestigious clerkships some of the students will hold af-
ter they graduate. Identifying the LSAT as a predictor of grades,
or even of later job performance, tells us only that this narrow
test picks people who thrive in particular types of environ-
ment-the ones that rely on the test to do their selection for
them. Yet those situations are contingent, not necessary. Change
the rules, and any test becomes more, or less, valid. Raise or
lower the hoop in a basketball game six inches, and you radical-
ly change the definition of who has merit.
Change the legal curriculum, or the way law is practiced, so
that it becomes more cooperative or empathic, and half the cur-
RACE (4th ed. Charles Scribner's Sons 1932) (1916).
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rent first-year class might not get in. The current arrangement
rewards people like us and so seems natural and right; the idea
that a school might let in a few students with lower scores
seems radical and dangerous, like going to an unqualified brain
surgeon.
The fifth argument is that affirmative action establishes
group rights, something the Constitution has never recognized
and that is especially dangerous in a democracy. But consider:
The Constitutional Convention was attended only by white men,
who provided for political representation only for people like
themselves. The document they drew up provided for the institu-
tion of slavery in no fewer than six clauses, which are still
there-you can look them up-as group-based a set of rights as
you are likely to find. One group was entitled to own another. A
century later, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments abol-
ished that, but Jim Crow and separate-but-equal laws main-
tained a system of group rights for nearly 100 more years.19 To
say that a paltry program of affirmative action that benefits a
few blacks and Mexicans a year violates a long-standing princi-
ple is an odd way to read history. We give rights to groups all
the time, for example, through favorable tax treatment,
veterans' preferences, senior citizen discounts, a hundred ways.
Like others, the argument turns out to be quite selective: groups
turn out to be troublesome only if they look different from our-
selves.
The sixth argument against affirmative action is that affir-
mative action injures relations between the races, producing
resentment among whites, and maybe Asians, who blame blacks
for their every defeat and trouble in life. Unlike most of the
other arguments, this one may well contain a grain of truth. But
the solution is not to abolish affirmative action; rather, it is to
explain to whites how very little actual displacement is occur-
ring. Admissions directors around the country will tell you that
every year the most indignant protests they receive are from
white applicants who would not have gotten into the institution
anyway, even if affirmative action did not exist. The ones who
are displaced, right at the margin, right at the very bottom, and
so who have to go to the immediately next-best school-Yale,
19 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390-94 (1978).
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say, instead of Harvard, or Seattle University rather than Wash-
ington-are just not that hugely disadvantaged, at least com-
pared to the hungry and determined black kid who struggled up
from a broken home and substandard schools but nevertheless
has real intellectual ability. A lot of things cause working-class
Caucasians to suffer real hardship these days, including profit-
driven corporations that send jobs to Third World countries,
close factories at the drop of a hat, and spend their time and
energy gobbling up each other instead of carrying out research
and development, all in hopes of making a quick buck. These
short-sighted, profit-driven actions cause a substantial loss of
jobs, certainly many times more than that caused by a few
blacks moving up.
If one continued looking for actions that limit the hopes of
white individuals interested in getting into undergraduate and
professional schools, one would find dozens of policies traceable
right to elite sources and government, such as a Congress that is
cutting student loans and a medical profession that maintains
an artificially low supply of doctors and medical schools. All of
us have cause to be upset over the increasing gap between the
poor and the rich in this country and diminishing upward mobil-
ity. But to blame the one and one half percent impact on profes-
sional and graduate school enrollment traceable to affirmative
action is to miss much of what is really going on.
The next argument is not empirical but theoretical. It holds
that affirmative action is reverse discrimination. But huge dif-
ferences separate "No blacks need apply" from a program that
gives blacks a moderate boost vis-&-vis whites. For one, the
purpose of affirmative action is remedial. Whites-only drinking
fountains and workplaces were not aimed at remedying any-
thing: not historical injustice against whites, nor anything else.
The purpose of affirmative action is radically different from that
of the old-fashioned, black- and Mexican-hating kind, namely to
help a historically marginalized group acquire the tools to enter
society on an equal basis. Relatively little displacement occurs,
as I mentioned earlier-about one and one half percent, as in
the parking lot example-while the earlier regime of "Whites
only need apply" excluded blacks one hundred percent. In dozens
of situations, the purpose and setting in which something is
done makes a large difference; otherwise, capital punishment
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would be the same as murder.
The eighth argument, that affirmative action violates the
principle of color blindness, is related to the previous one and
also is an armchair argument that simply does not hold true.
Our legal system, from the beginning, has been intensely color
conscious, as well as conscious of sex or gender. And this was so
not just in the early years of slavery and Indian conquest, but
continued on a formal level until very recently, and does on an
informal one today. Every single large-scale test of social preju-
dice reveals that Americans are highly color conscious. In a
typical example, testers from a university or governmental agen-
cy, one white, one black, go to check out apartments, apply for
jobs, buy things in stores, or apply for a loan.20 The two testers
are as alike as possible in income, education, age, personality,
etc., yet they report radically different experiences. For society,
then, to say, "We cannot take account of race" simply ratifies
and allows the unchecked accumulation of private prejudice.
The color-blind view is like a track meet. One of the athletes
systematically has been deprived of food all his life. People
laugh at him and throw garbage in his path. He lacks adequate
training facilities and cannot afford decent track shoes. You
bring him to the starting line with all the other, well-fed run-
ners, and say, "Okay, it's a fair race. No bumping or shoving.
Let the best man win." Given a fair chance and a helping hand,
the starved runner actually may turn out to be the best one, but
not by being thrust to the starting line and laughed at by the
crowd throughout the race. Color blindness makes us pretend
these things are not true.
The ninth argument holds that affirmative action
balkanizes, encouraging people to regard themselves as mem-
bers of small groups, jealously guarding their positions vis-a-vis
each other, rather than being simply Americans. It promotes
antagonism, ethnic strife, and a racial spoils system in which
the momentary victor, today's majority, gets to take advantage
of all the others or get even for imagined past sins.
But balkanization, properly understood, means small groups
or nations feuding, endlessly and senselessly reliving old griev-
20 E.g., Ian Ayers, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817 (1991).
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ances and settling old scores. It does not mean small groups who
have been deprived of their birthright and share of America's
bounty making demands on the larger society for redress. That
is not balkanization, but something quite different and, in many
cases, wholly legitimate.
The last few years have, indeed, seen an increase in ten-
sions among outgroups, such as Koreans versus blacks, blacks
versus Jews, blacks versus Hispanics, and so on. But this is not
so much because of affirmative action as it is because America
has been slow to extend its bounty to all. Raising the income
level of groups of color to a decent minimum would greatly ame-
liorate inter-group tension. Changing our racist immigration
and licensing rules also would help. Many Korean merchants
who run grocery stores in the inner city, for example, have pro-
fessional degrees, are pharmacists and teachers back in their
home countries, but cannot practice their professions here. That
is why they open small stores in Brooklyn or south-central Los
Angeles, where, unsurprisingly, they sometimes come into con-
flict with the people who live there.
The final argument is that we do not need affirmative ac-
tion-all we have to do is to enforce anti-discrimination laws
currently on the books. Ending all discrimination would, of
course, help a great deal, although it would do little for those
who lead blighted lives now from the legacy of slavery, Jim
Crow laws, and a century of neglect. Recall the runner on the
starting line for a race whose officials scrupulously monitor for
cheating, bumping, and other unfair tactics. Their scruples do
little good because the race itself is unfair.
But a second reason counsels that we should not rest con-
tent with existing laws against discrimination. The civil rights
laws, even more than others, are radically flouted and
underenforced. A 1987 survey by the University of Chicago
showed that seventy percent of employers in that city acknowl-
edged making distinctions in employment decisions based on
race and ethnicity.2' Yet only a small proportion of those mak-
21 William Julius Wilson et al., Urban Poverty and Family Life Survey of Chi-
cago 1987, (last modified May 1997) <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi/archive.prl?
path=ICPSR&format=tb&num=6258>; see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK
DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (reviewing the data).
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ing such decisions have a complaint filed against them; esti-
mates are on the order of one or two percent. Litigation is ex-
pensive; many valid complaints are not brought because of diffi-
culties of proof or because the victim decides "what's the use?" A
survey in another area, housing, conducted by a federal agency,
estimated between two and four million cases of housing dis-
crimination in this country per year.' Affirmative action must
remain as a supplement for imperfect enforcement of the law.
A variant of this argument charges that affirmative action
penalizes persons who did not own slaves or run plantations.
This innocence argument is a corollary of one we considered
earlier, namely that affirmative action benefits those who need
it least. Is it true that affirmative action punishes innocent
whites for the sins of their fathers? No. When a university sets
up a program to allow in a slightly larger number of blacks, its
purpose is far from punishing whites. If anything it wants to
broaden their education by exposing them to a new range of
experiences and ideas. When a university decides to let in Naval
ROTC scholarship holders, tuba players for the band, quarter-
backs who can throw a football seventy yards, veterans, or the
sons and daughters of wealthy alums, is it trying to punish
physics majors, the nonmusical, or pacifists? If it sets up a geo-
graphical quota for students from far away, is it unfair to the
locals, punishing them because their fathers and mothers com-
mitted the sin of having them be born in the state where Stan-
ford, say, is located? No. It is only with blacks and Latinos that
we find unfairness in a modest mechanism that lets a few of
them get ahead.
White people, even ones who had no part in the plantation
economy, still benefit from that economy and the development it
brought the South, just as all of us benefit from the railroads
the Chinese built, the farm labor of Mexicans, and the ruthless
development of Indian lands. Our friends and children benefit
from the informal set of privileges, favors, and courtesies we
extend each other and from which blacks and Mexicans are
22 See RONALD E. WIENK ET AL., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AMERI-
CAN HOUSING MARKETS (1979); George C. Galster, More Than Skin Deep: The Effect
of Housing on the Extent and Pattern of Racial Residential Segregation in the United




almost entirely excluded. Such practices include the artfully
crafted letter of recommendation that gets an erratic student
into a fine college, the summer job one of Dad's or Mom's friends
offers at the last minute, the teacher who discusses the extra
credit assignment with a favorite student that enables him or
her to raise a B-plus in an Honors course to an A-minus. These
are all examples of white privilege, an invisible system of courte-
sies and favors that has been going on for centuries and that
constitutes, in one way of looking at it, history's largest affirma-
tive action program: benefits, jobs, and other forms of help
awarded not on the basis of merit but acquaintance, friendship,
or other morally irrelevant, nonmeritocratic criteria.
As I have been speaking, you might have noticed that I
focused on majoritarian practices and justifications, drawing
attention to the inconsistent or self-serving nature of many of
them. Why? Because it is essential, I think, to focus on the way
we can easily define "the problem" as what those other people
are getting away with. A perfect example of this occurred recent-
ly. A department store chain withdrew a T-shirt saying that it
is time for a woman president.' Family values advocates saw it
and raised a storm. I maintain that they actually saw the
T-shirt as a slighting of their favorite principle. What they ne-
glected, of course, was that a woman president can have a fami-
ly, too. For example, if Hillary Clinton or Elizabeth Dole were
president, the very same family we know would be sitting in the
White House (assuming the marriages remain intact). A sound
principle-that families are good-was used repressively, on the
assumption that the wage-earner in a family always has to be
the man. Nothing is wrong with color blindness, neutral princi-
ples, merit, family values, or anything else the conservatives
hold dear. It is the one-sided, anti-woman and anti-minority
application of some of them that we should oppose.
Now comes the part that you have been waiting for, namely
when the speaker puts forward his or her suggestions on where
we should go from here. Let me preface this part by saying that
23 John Pacenti, Wal-Mart Pulls 'Someday a Woman Will Be President' T-
Shirts, AP, Sept. 22, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4407370. Under the threat of boy-
cotts by women's groups, Wal-Mart restocked its shelves with the shirts in time for
Christmas. Shirt Shrift, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzErE, Dec. 19, 1995, at B12.
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ideally, no change would be in order. In the thirty years of its
formal existence, affirmative action in education and jobs has
been yielding a small, but reliable stream of professionals of
color and abating black and brown poverty and misery, while
causing little displacement and no discernible deterioration in
the quality of goods and services. Public attitudes toward race
require mending, but in my opinion, affirmative action itself
does not.
Still, a restless public, not to mention a right-wing jugger-
naut, wants to see changes, so I offer two for purposes of discus-
sion.
The first would have affirmative action's supporters go back
to the situation that prevailed before Bakke' and reintroduce
the restitutive or reparational rationale. The current one for
higher education, diversity, was held to be a compelling state
interest in the Bakke decision a quarter century ago,' yet re-
cent decisions such as Podberesky" and Hopwood" have cast
doubt on it. Also, a host of commentators is beginning to ques-
tion whether Bakke even stood for that proposition at all, while
others have pointed out, perhaps correctly, that an interest stops
being compelling if not applied consistently, so that institutions
that base admissions on the need for diversity may not limit it
to race, but would need to give bonus points to other types of it,
such as intellectual or ideological diversity." These other forms
would end up swamping racial diversity numerically and greatly
limiting what colleges can do in bringing historically excluded
groups into the fold. And, of course, as everyone knows, Cali-
fornia has abolished racial preferences outright by popular refer-
endum.29
Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Amendment presumably will
always tolerate, or require, affirmative action by an institution
24 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25 Id. at 315.
26 Kirwan v. Podberesky, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
27 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
28 E.g., Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 381, 387-90
(1998).
29 Proposal 209 was passed Nov. 5, 1996 and held constitutional in Coalition
for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.




that has discriminated against a minority group so as to restore
it to the status quo ante. Graduate students, academics, and
even undergraduate researchers could investigate, publicize, and
make available to lawyers, courts, and governing boards the
checkered histories of racial exclusion, Jewish quotas, and all-
white fraternities that mar their own schools. If university
policymakers cooperated with local government to arrange
exclusionary zoning or to keep local housing costs high and thus
protect university investments, that should be brought out as
well. If academics played a role in promulgating racist genetic
theories of innate inferiority or routinely served as expert wit-
nesses in defending school districts charged with segregated
pupil assignment plans, that would be highly relevant, as well.
Researchers at Colorado are carrying out such a study, and a
number of historians and law professors I know around the
country are following suit."0
The second avenue would entail rolling with the punches
and taking seriously recent proposals to abandon race-based
affirmative action, now highly unpopular, in favor of a version
based on socioeconomic status or underprivilege, but with a
twist I will explain. First, notice that programs of this sort,
which give bonus points for childhood poverty, broken homes,
frequent moves, and so on, present three problems for those who
take racial justice seriously. First, the number of poor whites
greatly exceeds that of poor blacks and browns, so that these
programs would do relatively little to help those who are disad-
vantaged on both scores. Deeming race one disadvantaging fac-
tor among many would help, but only so much. Second, one
confronts what Deborah Malamud calls the "top of the bottom"
problem,"' but in a new form. Current race-based affirmative
action plans attract criticism because they are said to favor mid-
dle-class blacks, Mexicans, and other minorities over the very
poor. Colleges who draw from the pool of all minority applicants
naturally look with greatest favor on those who require the least
adjustment and are most likely to succeed, namely those who
30 Kevin Johnson at the University of California-Davis and Thomas D. Russell
at the University of Texas, for example.
31 Deborah Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 452, 458 (1997).
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are most like their usual pool of middle-class whites. With a
shift to socioeconomic status (SES), colleges will examine the
pool of disadvantaged applicants and choose those at the top of
that pool, with high grades and test scores, most of whom will
be white.
A third problem is that black or brown poverty is qualita-
tively different from the white kind. It tends to last forever, as I
mentioned, while poor whites remain that way for just a genera-
tion or two, after which the kids move up. For all these reasons,
substituting socioeconomic status for race is apt to do little to
advance racial integration.
One change would help a great deal, and I will close by
proposing it. We might take the idea of social class seriously and
devise a program based on SES that not only gives a helping
hand to those on the bottom of the scale, but corrects, or dis-
counts, for some of those at the top. Imagine a youth from a so-
cially prominent and well-heeled family who earns 1200 on the
SAT and has a grade point average of 3.1 from a famous prep
school. This student has enjoyed tutors, summer camps, and
European travel while growing up. Indulgent teachers, aware of
his famous family name, gave him extra-credit assignments and
other help to shore up a sagging grade and make sure that he
earned at least a B. As the time for taking the SAT rolled
around, the youth took a prep course costing over $1000. All of
us in education know students like this-socially advantaged,
rich, and often fairly dull. Their college application essays de-
scribe how hard they worked to make the cross-country team
and how it fortified their character. Sometimes you read about
them in the news, years later, when they flunk the bar exam for
the third time.
Contrast this applicant with a Chicano youth sporting an
SAT of 1160 and a GPA of 3.4 from an inner-city school, who
stepped in when dad went to jail, took care of his or her younger
brothers and sisters, delivered a paper route, and wrote an essay
explaining how to apply Cesar Chavez's ideas of religiously
based, collectivist social organization to the urban working poor.
I would pick the Mexican kid, and I bet most of you would, too. I
would also be inclined to apply a system of discounting or penal-
ty points to the very large number of bland, paradise-lost kids,
like the ones I described, who made little use of their opportuni-
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ties, have little idea what they want to do in life, and who our
experience as educators tells us are likely to disappoint but who
clutter up the field for the rest who really deserve and will bene-
fit from a college education. Just as conservatives point out,
correctly, that diversity cannot be a constitutionally valid reason
for admission purposes if we apply it selectively, we should tai-
lor programs based on socioeconomic advantage and disadvan-
tage in the manner I have suggested--that is, across the board.
Privilege, as Peggy McIntosh, 2 and now, John Hope
Franklin's commission," have pointed out, is the other half of
the dyad of distributional justice. If we limit ourselves to enforc-
ing civil rights laws against outright old-fashioned discrimina-
tion, but do nothing about the system of old-boy networks, fa-
vors, and family cronyism, the current social structure will re-
main roughly intact, with white dynasties at the top, and blacks,
browns, and other outsider groups at the bottom. My two sug-
gestions may not conquer all unfairness in the way health, edu-
cation, and other social goods are allocated, but could be a start
in the right direction. They might even have appealed to a cer-
tain Supreme Court justice, long dead, with Alabama roots, a
checkered record on racial justice but an undying commitment to
workers, the poor, and the common person.
Thank you.
32 Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in RACE, CLASS
AND GENDER: AN ANTHOLOGY (Margaret L. Andersen & Patricia Hill Collins eds.,
1992).
33 Advisory Board to the President's Initiative on Race, One America in the
21st Century: Forging a New Future (Sept. 18, 1998) <http'//www.whitehouse.gov/
Initiatives/OneAmerica/cevent.html>.
